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Patent Hazards and the Delimitation of "Defect"
in Strict Liability Cases-Luque v. McLean
While mowing a neighbor's lawn, the plaintiff, Celestino Luque, left the
rotary mower he was using and walked in front of it to pick up a carton in
its path. Slipping on the wet grass, the plaintiff fell backwards, severely injuring his hand as it entered an unguarded aperture in the blade housing
and struck the rapidly rotating blade. The aperture was marked with the
word "caution," and the lawnmower's owner, besides giving the plaintiff
general operating instructions, had warned him of the dangers of putting his
hand into the opening. Luque was aware of the hazard, but he argued at
trial that his injury was foreseeable to the defendants, the manufacturer,
distributor, and seller, in the mower's 1961 production year, and that the
injury could have been prevented by the addition of an inexpensive guard.'
The plaintiff, withdrawing theories of negligence and breach of warranty,
went to the jury on strict products liability theory. The trial judge felt there
was insufficient evidence to warrant instructions on assumption of the risk
and instructed the jury that the plaintiff would have to prove his lack of
awareness of the supposed defect in order to recover under strict liability.
The jury found for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court. Held, reversed: Strict liability in tort applies regardless of the latent or patent nature of the alleged defect, and assumption of
the risk being an affirmative defense, plaintiff is not required to prove that
he was unaware of the defect. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d
1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Products liability in tort, or the recovery by the user from the seller without privity of contract for an injury proximately caused by a defect in the
product, is chiefly a development of this century. Indeed, in the nineteenth
century the courts seemed unwilling to deal with injuries proximately caused
by unsafe or defective products unless there was a contractual relationship
between the user and the seller or manufacturer upon which to base an action. 2 However, even in that era, the privity requirement was occasionally
waived in cases involving a seller's or manufacturer's negligence where the
1 Defendant's expert testified that the inexpensive guard postulated by Luque was
not feasible and that the lawnmower itself surpassed the safety standards set by the
American Standards Association for the lawnmower's production year.
2 This unwillingness seems to have come about from a misreading of Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), which held there to be
no action in contract by plaintiff, a stagecoach passenger, against the manufacturer of
the coach in the absence of privity of contract. Apparently, this was read as disallowing an action in tort without privity of contract between the user and the seller. W.
PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 622 (4th ed. 1971).

It should be noted, however, that dicta and commentaries show a basis for strict
products liability in early English case law, especially in the area of food and drink.
See, e.g., Y.B. 9 HEN. VI, f. 53B, pl. 37 (1431); Roswel v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196,
79 Eng. Rep. 171 (1607). See generally Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1104 n.31 (1960).
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product was imminently or inherently dangerous to a human being. 8 Yet,
in general, it was felt that liability absent privity of contract "would place
too heavy a burden upon manufacturers and sellers [by holding] them responsible to hundreds of persons at a distance whose identity they could not
'
even know, and it was better to let the consumer suffer.

4

In the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick5 liability in tort attached to
manufacturer's negligence in the production of a defective, and resultingly

dangerous, product without regard for privity because the product, if negligently made, would have imperiled life or limb. Negligence was, and still
is, defined as the failure to use ordinary care in correcting, or warning
against, a defect or danger in the manufacture, design, or labeling of the

product-a defect the risk of which a manufacturer foresaw or should have
7
foreseen.6 The burden of showing a seller's failure to use reasonable care
is on the plaintiff, although lightened by the possible use of the doctrines
of res ipsa loquitur or negligence per se. 8

Sellers have also been found to be liable for a breach of express warranty. 9 Under this theory, however, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff not
only to prove an assertion of fact made by the seller regarding the defective

product, but, additionally, to prove that he relied upon the assertion and
was thereby proximately injured by the defect. 10 The use of implied warranty was the first major attempt to redirect the courts' attention from the
negligence or misrepresentations of the defendant to the reality of the existing defect which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The theories
of implied warranty and strict liability may be regarded as identical,1 ' since
both theories can be predicated on a representation of safety in proper use
3 In Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852), the court held that the mislabeling of a jar of poison was "an act of negligence imminently dangerous to the
lives of others" which did not require privity of contract to be actionable in tort. Prior
to Thomas case law in the United States supported apparently only one exception to the
general necessity of privity of contract. See, e.g., Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns.
468, 7 Am. Dec. 339 (N.Y. 1815), where a type of implied warranty in an action for
deceit was found in the sale of unwholesome foodstuffs. But this rule of implied warranty for food was strictly limited to sales for immediate consumption. Moses v.
Mead, 1 Denio 378, 43 Am. Dec. 676 (N.Y. 1845).
4 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 642. As applied to strict liability in the absence
of negligence, the idea is alive even today. See, e.g., Myers v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969), where, in rejecting strict liability, the court
noted that plaintiff could have chosen a safer product, in this case a lawnmower, and
when he rejected a mower with a guard in favor of a model without a guard, the
responsibility for subsequent injury was not to be borne by the manufacturer.
• 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6 Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 562, 567 (1969).
7 Ordinary or reasonable care seems to be a balance of the gravity of the harm and
the burden of precaution. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470,
467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1970).
8 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 8-9 (1965).
9 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, affd per curiam on
rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090
(1934) (glass, represented in sales brochures as shatterproof, shattered, injuring the
plaintiff).
10 Prosser, supra note 2, at 1136-37.
11 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment
m (1965) [this section hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT § 402A].
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implicit in the presence of the product on the market. But, implied warranty may still be burdened with its contract origin and such attendant prob12
lems as disclaimer of the implied warranty.
The landmark decision of the California Supreme Court in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,1" written by Justice Traynor, grounded the seller's
liability solely on the basis of strict liability in tort. 14 In Greenman a defectively designed home wood-working machine allowed a piece of wood
to fly out from the machine and strike the plaintiff. The court held that
"[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."' 5 The court made
it clear that the necessities of privity of contract or of plaintiff's reliance
on an express representation, as well as the possible defenses of disclaimer
of implied warranty and failure of the plaintiff to give notice of the breach
of warranty, were not applicable in a strict liability action. According to
Greenman the plaintiff could rely simply on the presence of the product on
the market as a representation of the product's safety. Additionally, the
court based strict products liability upon the rationale of the enterprise liability theory-a reallocation of the costs of injury by defects in the product
from the consumer, who is less able to protect himself or bear the costs,
to the manufacturer who, for profit, places the product on the market and
can insure against the risk of injury. 16
Two tests applicable in strict liability situations have emerged from the
1960's. While basically similar, and in some respects complementary, to
the Greenman test the test enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 402A,17 is not identical to that of Greenman.'s The tests share, as
12 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
However, after Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), disclaimer may be ineffective where implied warranty is held to include strict liability concepts.
13 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
14 Greenman itself applied to physical injury to the consumer or user. Strict liability is not limited to this. A user or consumer may recover for damage to the product
itself or to other property. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963); accord, RESTATEMENT § 402A(1). Recovery has been allowed for mere economic loss where the product was not as represented. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Contra, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
Texas adopted strict liability in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), for foodstuffs. The theory was given full play with the adoption of RESTATEMENT § 402A. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787
(Tex. 1967) (for personal injury); Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 418
S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967) (for injury to property).
15 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
16id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The court cited Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring
opinion of Traynor, J.). Justice Traynor's opinion in Escola was perhaps the first
major expression of the need to apply enterprise liability in products liability cases.
17 § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if ...
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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a common starting point, basic elements of proof: the plaintiff must show
that he was injured by a defect in the product and that such defect was in
the product when it left the seller's hands. 19 The plaintiff is relieved of
the burden of proving negligence on the part of the seller, although negligence may still be present. 2 0 The point of divergence of the two tests seems
to be the use, in the Restatement, of the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." The California Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp.2 1 took issue with the use of the term. The court reasoned that
a plaintiff might be placed in the position of proving not only the existence
of the defect, but also, that the defect was unreasonably dangerous-a twolayer proof instead of a single element. Even if the proof were unitary,
the court continued, it would be likely that "unreasonably dangerous" as a
modification of "defect" would create an element of proof that "rings with
negligence. '22 Upon this argument, the court in Cronin refused to vary the

original Greenman test and removed "unreasonably dangerous" as a part of
plaintiff's proof in a California strict liability action. 28
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product ....
RESTATEMENT § 402A.

18 Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969) (collects
cases following each approach); accord, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,

132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co.,
123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
'9 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 840 (1966). See also Prosser, supra note 2, at 1114-15; Wade, supra
note 8, at 13.
20 Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. Rav. 325,
326 n.5 (1971). Negligence may not always be present and release from the necessity
of proving negligence may, therefore, be decisive. See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland's,
Inc., 509 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973). However, several writers believe that the overall effect
on the plaintiff's problems of proof is small, especially with the availability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 6, at 563; Rheingold, supra
at 326 n.5; Wade, supra note 8, at 8-9.
21 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
22 Id. at 132-34, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42. The court was
particularly worried about the possible interpretation of RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i, which defines unreasonably dangerous as a condition beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer, as some sort of reasonable man-negligence test.
23 Accord, Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
There may be a problem with this approach, however. The California Supreme Court
"simply rejects the notion that the product must be unreasonably dangerous to be
defective, and then substitutes nothing in the place of that notion to give content to the
term defective." Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 33 (1973). The California Supreme Court had previously discussed various
definitions of "defect" pointing out that "unreasonably dangerous" may turn on negligence proofs, and perhaps may be at variance with Greenman. A third definition of
"defect" was pointed out at that time by the court, that of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314(2) (c): not "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used." Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1971).

See also L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRoDuCTs LIABILITY § 16A[4], at

3-223, -224, -224.1 (rev. ed. 1973); Keeton, supra, at 36-38.
While Cronin appears to have left the meaning of "defect" less definite than before,
a floor may be laid by saying that a defect must be something more than a condition
that causes injury. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366, 367, 372 (1965). For example, injury resulting from hitting oneself on the thumb with a hammer does not mean that the
hammer head is defective, but where a piece of the head chips off striking the plaintiff
in the eye, the head may well be found to be defective. See Dunham v. Vaughan &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). In addition, approached on
a theory of enterprise liability, Cronin could be read to mean that a seller, while not an
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II. PATENT HAZARDS

In addition to the problem of finding a workable definition of "defect,"
the courts have divided over the related question of whether a patent hazard,
an obvious hazard normally found in the design of the product rather than
created as an accident of manufacturing, is to be treated as a defect for the
creation of liability or merely as a consumer's risk of use. Some support has
developed for the proposition that when the design is dangerous or hazardous, but the danger is obvious to the ordinary user, the design, at least
with regard to that danger, is simply not defective. 24 This concept may be
phrased in terms of duty: a seller is under no obligation to make a hazardous product safe, or safer, when it is otherwise fit for its intended use
and the dangerous aspect is readily apparent so that the user may be assumed to appreciate it. 2 5 In Campo v. Scofield, a leading decision denying
recovery and holding there to be no such duty, it was stated that "[i]f a
manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any
latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not
known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands.
. . . [The manufacturer] is under no duty to guard against injury from a

patent peril or from a source manifestly dangerous."' 26 There is, however,
a trend in some more recent decisions in several jurisdictions toward allowing
recovery for injury from obvious hazards, thereby bringing such hazards
within the bounds of defect and allowing recovery on the same basis as
latent defects where the product is judged defective or unreasonably danger27

ous.

absolute insurer of the safety of his product, is an insurer to the extent that he is
liable for any injury proximately caused by a condition existing in the product when
the product left the seller's hand so long as the plaintiff was not misusing the product.
24 Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Yaun v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948) (negligence). See also
Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J.
301, 306 (1967).
25 Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 Il1. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849
(1964); Bowen v. Western Auto Supply Co., 273 So. 2d 546 (La. Ct. App. 1973)
(lawnmower guard was delivered with instructions, but the guard was not attached; the
plaintiff was found to have been contributorily negligent for using the lawnmower
without the guard); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Kientz
v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957); Freedman, "Defect" in the Product:
The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV.

323, 331 (1961).
26 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950); cf. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 837-38 (1962),
where the author feels that Campo indicates only that obviousness is one factor to be
considered, without imposing a rigid requirement that the defects be latent.
27 The trend may be a result either of a demand that the seller assume a duty of
ensuring safety or of a pure notion of reallocation of the risk to one who can bear it
more easily, or can redistribute it. Courts usually seem to combine both theories on
the basis that if the seller fails to assume the duty of safety, the failure may justify the
reallocation theory. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633,
105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 641,
274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d
465 (1966); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); cf. Metal
Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (minor injury insufficient to justify reallocation of the
risk when balanced with the utility of the product and substantial compliance with the
duty of safety).
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Even if the plaintiff clears the hurdle presented by the Campo no-duty
rule, there is another problem. "Unreasonably dangerous" is defined in the
Restatement in terms of a condition which is more dangerous than contemplated by the ordinary consumer, 28 and "defective condition" is defined to
mean "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer. '2 9 Both of
these terms relate to the problem of proof of defects which the court in
Cronin tried to resolve, and appear to remove from the scope of "defect"
an obviously hazardous product.8 0 Language can be found in Greenman
itself to indicate that a plaintiff cannot recover under a strict liability theory
if he was aware of the existence of a defect. 8 ' These statements may be
dangerous traps. They may place the plaintiff in the position of having to
prove that he was not aware, and had no reason to be aware of the hazard
in the product. In effect, the plaintiff's prima facie proof could come to in82
volve a refutation of the defense of assumption of the risk.
III. LuQUE v. MCLEAN
The California Supreme Court in Luque v. McLean"8 re-examined the
RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i.
29
Id. comment g.
80
See, e.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P,2d 191 (1969) (RESTATEMENT § 402A and Greenman interpreted to deny recovery-awareness); Myers v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969) (dictum-RESTATEMENT
§ 402A inapplicable to an obvious lack of a safety guard on a power mower).
The term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" was, perhaps, more properly
concerned with certain "unavoidably unsafe products" such as drugs, or products which
are socially desirable although having associated risks, such as butter (cholesterol) or
whiskey. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
23 (1966). The use of the term has grown away from this limitation and has had a
regressive effect on strict liability theory. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
132-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972). Thus, the language of the RESTATEMENT, see text accompanying notes 28, 29 supra, concerning conditions contemplated by the ordinary consumer seems to be a trap for plaintiffs when
the language is read simply as "awareness." See, e.g., Mass v. Dreher, supra; Myers
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra.
31 "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved
that he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was intended to be used as a
result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (emphasis
added). This is not the holding in Greenman. The actual holding is set out in the
text accompanying note 15 supra.
32 To say, in the case of a patent defect, or, in less conclusory language, an
obvious hazard or danger, that a seller has no duty to place safety devices or guards
on his products or to say that the user has "assumed the risk" can be far too broad.
Even if the danger is patent or obvious to a user, it may not be so to an injured
bystander. If there is a no-duty rule, then there could be no recovery for such a plaintiff. See Keeton, supra note 6, at 567.
Seemingly, one such case occurred where the decedent was run over by a bulldozer
which, although designed to work forward and backward, had a large blindspot to the
rear. Decedent, whose job was to direct traffic on the construction site, was killed
when the vehicle backed over him. Although plaintiff recovered, under a strict no-duty
rule such might not have been the result, even though the decedent was not a user,
and perhaps was not aware of the extent of the blindspot. Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
Saying that there is an obvious hazard is not the same as saying that the plaintiff
actually appreciated the full extent of the danger. In criticizing the no-duty theory,
it has been pointed out that the questions of full appreciation and even of momentary
forgetfulness may be automatically foreclosed. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 7.02, at 117 (rev. ed. 1973).
33 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
28
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language of Greenman, especially the language that seems to require plaintiff to prove that he was not aware of the defect,3 4 and found that the phrase
merely reiterated the fact that the plaintiff must not be shown by the defendant to have assumed the risk. Moreover, the court held that the defect
need not be latent.

Under Greenman and Luque the plaintiff meets his

initial burden of proof when he shows an injury proximately caused by a defect existing in the product at the time it left the hands of the seller or
35

manufacturer.
Implicit in the patent design defect cases is a balance of interests between
the aware, but otherwise innocent, plaintiff and the seller, especially, but
not limited to, the manufacturer, who fails to make his product safe or safer
within reasonable cost limits and without destroying the usefulness of the
product. For example, in one case 86 rearview mirrors on a bulldozer which
was designed to operate in either direction would have sharply reduced the
size and thus the danger of a rearward blindspot. In Luque and other
power mower cases3 7 inexpensive guard devices would have made the products less dangerous. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that
hazardous industrial machinery could be found defective for a failure of
the manufacturer to include safety devices so long as the devices did not
render the machinery unusable for its purpose, even when there was an
expectation that the subsequent purchaser (factory owner) would assume
the duty to install safety devices.38
See note 31 supra.
3 Luque verifies the actual holding in Greenman: "'A Manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being.'" Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 141, 501 P.2d 1163, 1166, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 446 (1972), quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62,
377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). Apparently, "knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects" is not to be transformed into or interpreted
as a requirement that some defects would be so obvious that the plaintiff would automatically "inspect" the machine and by such "inspection" remove himself from the
protection of the Greenman rule. The court in Luque, however, did not address this
point; perhaps, the court felt that no such convoluted reasoning would be forwarded in
light of their disposition of the awareness argument.
36 Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470-72, 467 P.2d 229, 232-34, 85
Cal. Rptr. 629, 632-34 (1970); see note 32 supra. The court in Luque noted that the
discussion in Pike of patent, as opposed to latent, hazards was in terms of negligence
(a duty based on the balance of the risk involved and the burden of precaution), but
was also applicable to strict liability. In any event, the court stated that it would be
anomalous to allow recovery for a patent defect on a negligence theory while denying
it under strict liability. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144-45, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169,
104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972).
37 See, e.g., Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966);
Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964);
Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Kientz v.
Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
38 Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga v.
Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
The seller may well face the reality that an industrial purchaser who, by custom and
state law, is required to place safety devices on otherwise dangerous machinery will
fail to do so and the undischarged duty will be found to rest with the manufacturer for
proximately resulting injuries to the industrial purchaser's employees. See Finnegan v.
Havir Mfg. Corp., supra; Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., supra; accord, Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972). RESTATEMENT
§ 402A(1)(b) (which is based on the expectation that the product reaches the consumer without substantial change) may be to the contrary. Wheeler v. Standard Tool
34
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The thrust of Luque is that a seller or manufacturer is required to mar-

ket a safe product or suffer the consequences of all injuries proximately
caused by the defect, a responsibility to be regarded as a cost of doing business. The duty fixed by Luque is in sharp contrast to the older line of
thinking, still very much alive, that "the absence of these safety devices was
apparent at the time of purchase, and, in a free market, [the plaintiff] had
the choice of buying a mower equipped with them, of buying the mower
' 39
which he did, or of buying no mower at all."
The holding in Luque that lack of awareness is no part of plaintiff's initial proof, although the awareness may be a possible issue in the defense
of assumption of the risk, is not extremely enlightening.

This is especially

true when viewed through the defendant's eyes, since the issue of assumption of the risk was withdrawn from the jury by the trial court and was not
commented upon by the supreme court.

There are, however, indications

in Luque, in the light of Cronin, which was decided the same day, which
serve to give some feeling for the degree of awareness on the part of the

plaintiff necessary to negate a seller's liability.

These indications may

serve, in addition, to delimit the concept of defect.
In Luque the plaintiff was well aware of the existence of the hazard.

Ordinary contributory negligence, if indeed it was present, is not a defense
to a strict liability action in many jurisdictions; but assumption of the risk
-61 'voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger' "-may be such a defense. 40 So too, under Luque and the Restatement,
plaintiff's awareness was part of the defense. 41 Also, the same court, in
Cronin, when it removed the term "unreasonably dangerous" from the Calfornia strict liability test, would seem to have removed the "contemplated
& Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (interpreting Connecticut law); Bexiga
v. Havir Mfg. Corp., supra. But see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), where the court felt that the RESTATEMENT rule of substantial change might
limit liability only where the entire product would undergo substantial modification.
The RESTATEMENT expresses no opinion as to whether a court may go farther in applying strict liability to a product for which there is a substantial expectation of change
before it reaches the ultimate consumer. RESTATEMENT § 402A, caveat (2), comment
on caveat p.
39
Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855, 864 (1969).
40
Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443,
450 (1972) (emphasis in original); accord, Smith v. Dhy-Dynamic Co., 31 Cal. App.
3d 852, 107 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1973) (actual knowledge and appreciation of a specific
danger); RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment n.
The same rule appears in Texas cases. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. 1967); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
Where contributory negligence is available as a defense to a strict liability action,
the defense has in some cases been disallowed for reasons of social justice. For example, where a factory worker is injured because of the lack of a safety guard on
equipment that he is assigned to use, "[iut would be anomalous to hold that [a manufacturer] has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no
liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against." Bexiga v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972). See also Wheeler v. Standard Tool
& Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Davaney v. Sarno, 122 N.J. Super.
99, 299 A.2d 95 (1973).
41 RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment n, quoted in Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,
145 n.9, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170 n.9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 450 n.9 (1972). Luque seemed
to regard the Restatement and Greenman as in basic harmony, neither requiring that
the plaintiff prove his lack of awareness of the defect. Id. at 145-46, 501 P.2d at
1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
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condition" approach, 42 again, at least as an element of plaintiff's proof.
One may then argue that whatever awareness or "contemplation" of the
danger the plaintiff had is of no consequence unless it rises to an assumption of the risk. There are several ascending stages of awareness: awareness of the fashion of the design; physical awareness that the danger or
hazard exists; appreciation of the extent of the danger; carelessness in the
use of the product in combination with the awareness of the danger or its
extent; and, an appreciation of the danger together with a willing and unreasonable encountering of such danger. Only the last stage constitutes as43
sumption of the risk.
The court in Luque also noted that a plaintiff cannot be taken to assume
all commonly known risks without encountering a problem similar to the
disclaimers of implied warranty. 44 If the notion of contemplation by the
ordinary consumer is not an exact measure of the level of awareness which
is assumption of the risk, it may be more accurate to consider it as simply
a weight in the balance of risk reallocation.45
IV.

CONCLUSION

Considering Luque along with other patent hazard cases, it seems fair to
say that the more liberal trend is to allow the plaintiff to recover-specifically, to find that there is a question of fact for the jury as to the existence
of a defect-where the hazard is obvious or patent. Otherwise, a manufacturer would be advised to make all of his perchance latent errors obvious
or patent, a concept in the nature of a disclaimer.
The pivotal point of Luque is the delimitation of the word "defect." The
question of inclusion within the term "defect" of patent design hazards is
one of the more difficult issues facing the courts in the products liability
area. Luque provides no specific guides for determination of the degree of
safety necessary in a product's design, or conversely, the risks a user or
consumer must be taken to have accepted as the nature of the product.
46
Yet, in Luque and in cases that have gone beyond it,
it would appear that
reallocation of the risk is the decisive criterion, basing the decisions in such
cases on a theory of enterprise liability. 47 Were these decisions establishing
42See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.

The point is well illustrated by

RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i, which defines "unreasonably dangerous":

"dan-

gerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
... with the ordinary knowledge common to the community .... ." (Emphasis
added.) While the rule is exemplified in the comment by good whiskey and its commonly known characteristics, in practice the rule has not been so applied.

It should

be fair under Luque and Cronin to say that the comment is neither a contributory
negligence test (ordinary knowledge of the ordinary consumer) nor a limitation to
latent dangers (contemplated).

43 See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and

Assumption
of the Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 127 (1972).
44
Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145 n.9, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170 n.9, 104
Rptr. 443, 450 n.9 (1972), quoting from Traynor, supra note 23, at 371.
45 See note 27 supra.
46 See, e.g., cases cited note 38 supra.
47 Roscoe Pound seemed to develop at least two stages of enterprise liability:
insurance idea" that, as a society, we should each bear the losses of the other,
that the law's function is to place the initial burden on those who can pass the
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NOTES

a seller's duty to market a safe product mere expression of a public policy
of incentive to do such, it would then be necessary that a product not be
judged defective without measuring the foreseeability by the seller of risks
while the product was in the user's hands. It could not follow from an incentive theory alone that a manufacturer could be liable for injuries proximately caused by a product he believed safe, since his apparent obligation
would end with such a belief. Certainly, foreseeability is still important in
establishing a defect. However, the outward limit of the term "defect" expands rapidly with the affirmative duty to search out the safer design 48
and, as in the case of safety devices, to see that such devices are affixed
to the product.
Luque is another refinement of Greenman in the development of strict
liability theory. Luque, read with Greenman, appears to establish the outermost limit of the development of a function of enterprise liability. Such a
policy is rapidly becoming a controlling criterion of several courts in an effort to redistribute the risks of use from the consumer to the seller. 49 Risks
are simply chances that certain possibly correctable hazards of using a
product will create accidents; accidents are business costs which the seller
can bear more easily than the user or, going somewhat farther, which the
user ought not to be expected to bear. To put the issue in terms of defining
a "defect" may beg the question since, by definition, a perfectly safe
product will not injure the user. As yet, however, few courts will contend
that injury alone defines "defect." Rather, for some courts, the word "defect" is a code word for the current boundary between foreseeability and
pure enterprise liability, i.e., a defect is the function of these two contending
forces which establish the degree of social policy development which is
sought to be practiced. 50 The issue of social responsibility, for either the
along to the general public; and "the involuntary Good Samaritan," probably a mere
expansion of the insurance idea, that as a humanitarian principle the one more capable
of bearing the loss ought to bear the loss. Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative
Law, 100U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1951).
48 "Reduction of the threshold probability required before a defendant-manufacturer
can be held liable in either negligence or strict liability has resulted from the abandonment of rigid categorical judgments about what kinds of uses and users are foreseeable,
and from an increased willingness to submit such issues to juries where the determination 'depends on policy values underlying the "common affairs of life.""'
Hall v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
49 The rationale of Greenman is to be found in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.).
This opinion seems to reflect both incentive and allocative theories: "Even if there
is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever
it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market ....
[Tihe risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." id. at 461-62,
150 P.2d at 440-41.
In criticizing the concurring opinion in Escola, Professor Pound noted the development of a new "jural postulate" as part and parcel of a new "regime of dirigism" or
humanitarian based control: "'In civilized society men are entitled to assume that
they will be secured by the state against all loss or injury, even though the result
of their own fault or improvidence, and to that end that liability to repair all loss or
injury will be cast by law on some one better able to bear it.'" Pound, supra note 47,
at 14, 15.
See
also Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973).
50
See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
But see Keeton, supra note 23, at 38; Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27

